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Abstract. Language-based information flow methods offer a principled way to enforce
strong security properties, but enforcing noninterference is too inflexible for realistic appli-
cations. Security-typed languages have therefore introduced declassification mechanisms
for relaxing confidentiality policies, and endorsement mechanisms for relaxing integrity
policies. However, a continuing challenge has been to define what security is guaranteed
when such mechanisms are used. This paper presents a new semantic framework for ex-
pressing security policies for declassification and endorsement in a language-based setting.
The key insight is that security can be characterized in terms of the influence that de-
classification and endorsement allow to the attacker. The new framework introduces two
notions of security to describe the influence of the attacker. Attacker control defines what
the attacker is able to learn from observable effects of this code; attacker impact captures
the attacker’s influence on trusted locations. This approach yields novel security condi-
tions for checked endorsements and robust integrity. The framework is flexible enough to
recover and to improve on the previously introduced notions of robustness and qualified
robustness. Further, the new security conditions can be soundly enforced by a security
type system. The applicability and enforcement of the new policies is illustrated through
various examples, including data sanitization and authentication.
1. Introduction
Many common security vulnerabilities can be seen as violations of either confidentiality or
integrity. As a general way to prevent these information security vulnerabilities, information
flow control has become a popular subject of study, both at the language level [23] and at the
operating-system level (e.g., [14, 12, 30]). The language-based approach holds the appeal
that the security property of noninterference [13], can be provably enforced using a type
system [27]. In practice, however, noninterference is too rigid: many programs considered
secure need to violate noninterference in limited ways.
Using language-based downgrading mechanisms such as declassification [17, 21] and en-
dorsement [20, 29], programs can be written in which information is intentionally released,
and in which untrusted information is intentionally used to affect trusted information or
1998 ACM Subject Classification: D.3.3, D.4.6.
Key words and phrases: Security type system, information flow, noninterference, confidentiality, integrity,
robustness, downgrading, declassification, endorsement, security policies.
LOGICAL METHODSl IN COMPUTER SCIENCE DOI:10.2168/LMCS-7 (3:17) 2011 © A. Askarov and A. C. MyersCC© Creative Commons
2 A. ASKAROV AND A. C. MYERS
decisions. Declassification relaxes confidentiality policies, and endorsement relaxes integrity
policies. Both endorsement and declassification have been essential for building realistic ap-
plications, such as various applications built with Jif [15, 18]: games [5], a voting system [11],
and web applications [9].
A continuing challenge is to understand what security is obtained when code uses down-
grading. This paper contributes a more precise and satisfactory answer to this question, par-
ticularly clarifying how the use of endorsement weakens confidentiality. While much work
has been done on declassification (usefully summarized by Sands and Sabelfeld [24]), there
is comparatively little work on the interaction between confidentiality and endorsement.
To see such an interaction, consider the following notional code example, in which a
service holds both old data (old_data) and new data (new_data), but the new data is not
to be released until time embargo_time. The variable new_data is considered confidential,
and must be declassified to be released:
if request_time >= embargo_time
then return declassify(new_data)
else return old_data
Because the requester is not trusted, the requester must be treated as a possible attacker.
Suppose the requester has control over the variable request_time, which we can model by
considering that variable to be low-integrity. Because the intended security policy depends
on request_time, the attacker controls the policy that is being enforced, and can obtain
the confidential new data earlier than intended. This example shows that the integrity
of request_time affects the confidentiality of new_data. Therefore, the program should
be considered secure only when the guard expression, request_time >= embargo_time, is
high-integrity.
A different but reasonable security policy is that the requester may specify the request
time as long as the request time is in the past. This policy could be enforced in a language
with endorsement by first checking the low-integrity request time to ensure it is in the
past; then, if the check succeeds, endorsing it to be high-integrity and proceeding with the
information release. The explicit endorsement is justifiable because the attacker’s actions
are permitted to affect the release of confidential information as long as adversarial inputs
have been properly sanitized. This is a common pattern in servers that process possibly
adversarial inputs.
Robust declassification has been introduced in prior work [28, 16, 10] as a semantic
condition for secure interactions between integrity and confidentiality. The prior work also
develops type systems for enforcing robust declassification, which are implemented as part
of Jif [18]. However, prior security conditions for robustness are not satisfactory, for two
reasons. First, these prior conditions characterize information security only for terminating
programs. A program that does not terminate is automatically considered to satisfy robust
declassification, even if it releases information improperly during execution. Therefore the
security of programs that do not terminate, such as servers, cannot be described. A second
and perhaps even more serious limitation is that prior security conditions largely ignore the
possibility of endorsement, with the exception of qualified robustness [16]. Qualified robust-
ness gives the endorse operation a somewhat ad-hoc, nondeterministic semantics, to reflect
the attacker’s ability to choose the endorsed value. This approach operationally models what
the attacker can do, but does not directly describe the attacker’s control over confidentiality.
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The introduction of nondeterminism also makes the security property possibilistic. How-
ever, possibilistic security properties have been criticized because they can weaken under
refinement [22, 25].
The main contribution of this paper is a general, language-based semantic framework
for expressing information flow security and semantically capturing the ability of the at-
tacker to influence both the confidentiality and integrity of information. The key building
blocks for this semantics are attacker knowledge [1] and its (novel) dual, attacker impact,
which respectively describe what attackers can know and what they can affect. Building
upon attacker knowledge, the interaction of confidentiality and integrity, which we term
attacker control, can be characterized formally. The robust interaction of confidentiality
and integrity can then be captured cleanly as a constraint on attacker control. Further,
endorsement is naturally represented in this framework as a form of attacker control, and a
more satisfactory version of qualified robustness can be defined. All these security conditions
can be formalized in both progress-sensitive and progress-insensitive variants, allowing us to
describe the security of both terminating and nonterminating systems.
We show that the progress-insensitive variants of these improved security conditions
are enforced soundly by a simple security type system. Recent versions of Jif have added a
checked endorsement construct that is useful for expressing complex security policies [9], but
whose semantics were not precisely defined; this paper gives semantics, typing rules and a
semantic security condition for checked endorsement, and shows that checked endorsement
can be translated faithfully into simple endorsement at both the language and the semantic
level. Our type system can easily be adjusted to enforce the progress-sensitive variants of
the security conditions, as has been shown in the literature [26, 19].
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows how to define in-
formation security in terms of attacker knowledge. Section 3 introduces attacker control.
Section 4 defines progress-sensitive and progress-insensitive robustness using the new frame-
work. Section 5 extends this to improved definitions of robustness that allow endorsements,
generalizing qualified robustness. A type system for enforcing these robustness conditions
is presented in Section 6. The checked endorsement construct appears in Section 7, which
introduces a new notion of robustness that allows checked endorsements, and shows that
it can be understood in terms of robustness extended with simple endorsements. Section 8
introduces attacker impact. Additional examples are presented in Section 9, related work is
discussed in Section 10, and Section 11 concludes.
This paper is an extended version of a previous paper by the same authors [4]. The
significant changes include proofs of all the main theorems, a semantic rather than syntactic
definition of fair attacks, and a renaming of “attacker power” to “attacker impact”.
2. Semantics
Information flow levels. We assume two security levels for confidentiality — public and
secret — and two security levels for integrity — trusted and untrusted. These levels are
denoted respectively P, S and T,U. We define information flow ordering v between these
two levels: P v S, and T v U. The four levels define a security lattice, as shown on Figure 1.
Every point on this lattice has two security components: one for confidentiality, and one for
integrity. We extend the information flow ordering to elements on this lattice: `1 v `2 if the
ordering holds between the corresponding components. As is standard, we define join `1unionsq`2
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P,T
P,U
S,U
S,T
Figure 1. Informa-
tion flow lattice
e ::= n | x | e op e
c ::= skip | x := e | c; c
| if e then c1 else c2 | while e do c
Figure 2. Syntax of the language
〈n,m〉 ↓ n 〈x,m〉 ↓ m(x) 〈e1,m〉 ↓ v1 〈e2,m〉 ↓ v2 v = v1 op v2〈e1 op e2,m〉 ↓ v
Figure 3. Semantics of expressions
〈skip,m〉−→〈stop,m〉 〈e,m〉 ↓ v〈x := e,m〉−→(x,v)〈stop,m[x 7→ v]〉
〈c1,m〉−→t〈c′1,m′〉
〈c1; c2,m〉−→t〈c′1; c2,m′〉
〈c1,m〉−→t〈stop,m′〉
〈c1; c2,m〉−→t〈c2,m′〉
〈e,m〉 ↓ n n 6= 0
〈if e then c1 else c2,m〉−→〈c1,m〉
〈e,m〉 ↓ n n = 0
〈if e then c1 else c2,m〉−→〈c2,m〉
〈e,m〉 ↓ n n 6= 0
〈while e do c,m〉−→〈c; while e do c,m〉
〈e,m〉 ↓ n n = 0
〈while e do c,m〉−→〈stop,m〉
Figure 4. Semantics of commands
as the least upper bound of `1 and `2, and meet `1u `2 as the greatest lower bound of `1 and
`2. All four lattice elements are meaningful; for example, it is possible for information to
be both secret and untrusted when it depends on both secret and untrusted (i.e., attacker-
controlled) values. This lattice is the simplest possible choice for exploring the topics of this
paper; however, the results of this paper straightforwardly generalize to the richer security
lattices used in other work on robustness [10].
Language and semantics. We consider a simple imperative language with syntax presented
in Figure 2. The semantics of the language is fairly standard and is given in Figures 3
and 4. For expressions, we define big-step evaluation of the form 〈e,m〉 ↓ v, where v is
the result of evaluating expression e in memory m. For commands, we define a small-step
operational semantics, in which a single transition is written as 〈c,m〉−→t〈c′,m′〉, where c
and m are the initial command and memory, and c′ and m′ are the resulting command and
memory. The only unusual feature is the annotation t on each transition, which we call
an event. Events record assignments: an assignment to variable x of value v is recorded
by an event (x, v). This corresponds to our attacker model, in which the attacker may
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only observe assignments to public variables. We write 〈c,m〉−→∗~t to mean that trace ~t
is produced starting from 〈c,m〉 using zero or more transitions. Each trace ~t is composed
of individual events t1 ·t2 · · · tk · · · , and a prefix of ~t up to the i-th event is denoted as ~ti;
we use the operator · to denote the concatenation of two traces or events. If a transition
does not affect memory, its event is empty, which is either written as  or is omitted, e.g.:
〈c,m〉−→〈c′,m′〉.
Finally, we assume that the security environment Γ maps program variables to their
security levels. Given a memorym, we writemP for the public part of the memory; similarly,
mT is the trusted part of m. We write m =T m′ when memories m and m′ agree on their
trusted parts, and m =P m′ when m and m′ agree on their public parts.
2.1. Attacker knowledge
This section provides background on the attacker-centric model for information flow secu-
rity [1]. We recall definitions of attacker knowledge, progress knowledge, and divergence
knowledge, and introduce progress-(in)sensitive release events.
Low events. Among the events that are generated during a trace, we distinguish a sequence
of low (or public) events. Low events correspond to observations that an attacker can
make during a run of the program. We assume that the attacker may observe individual
assignments to public variables. Furthermore, if the program terminates, we assume that a
termination event ⇓ may also be observed by the attacker. If attacker can detect divergence
of programs (cf. Definition 2.3) then divergence ⇑ is also a low event.
Given a trace ~t, low events in that trace are denoted as ~tP. A single low event is often
denoted as `, and a sequence of low events is denoted as ~`. We overload the notation
for semantic transitions, writing 〈c,m〉−→∗~` if only low events produced from configuration
〈c,m〉 are relevant; that is, there is a trace ~t such that 〈c,m〉−→∗~t ∧ ~tP = ~`. Low events are
the key element in the definition of attacker knowledge [1].
The knowledge of the attacker is described by the set of initial memories compatible
with low observations. Any reduction in this set means the attacker has learned something
about secret parts of the initial memory.
Definition 2.1 (Attacker knowledge). Given a sequence of low events ~`, initial low memory
mP, and program c, attacker knowledge is
k(c,mP, ~`) , {m′ | mP = m′P ∧ 〈c,m′〉−→∗~`}
Attacker knowledge gives a handle on what information the attacker learns with every low
event. The smaller the knowledge set, the more precise is the attacker’s information about
secrets. Knowledge is monotonic in the number of low events: as the program produces low
events, the attacker may learn more about secrets.
Two extensions of attacker knowledge are useful: progress knowledge [3, 2] and divergence
knowledge [3].
Definition 2.2 (Progress knowledge). Given a sequence of low events ~`, initial low memory
mP, and a program c, define progress knowledge k→(c,mP, ~`) as
k→(c,mP, ~`) , {m′ | m′P = mP ∧ ∃`′ . 〈c,m′〉−→∗~`〈c′′,m′′〉−→∗`′}
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Progress knowledge represents the information the attacker obtains by seeing public events ~`
followed by some other public event. Progress knowledge and attacker knowledge are related
as follows: given a program c, memory m and a sequence of low events `1 · · · `n obtained
from 〈c,m〉, we have that for all i < n,
k(c,mP, ~`i) ⊇ k→(c,mP, ~`i) ⊇ k(c,mP, ~`i+1)
To illustrate this with an example, consider program l := 0; (while h = 0 do skip); l :=
h with initial memory m(h) = 7. This program produces a sequence of two low events
(l, 0)·(l, 7). The knowledge after the first event k(c,mP, (l , 0)) is a set of all possible memories
that agree with m on the public parts and can produce the low event (l , 0). Note that no
low events are possible after the first assignment unless h is non-zero. Progress knowledge
reflects this: k→(c,mP, (l , 0)) is a set of memories such that h 6= 0. Finally, the knowledge
after two events k(c,mP, (l , 0)·(l , 7)) is a set of memories where h = 7.
Using attacker knowledge, one can express many confidentiality policies [7, 2, 8]. For
example, a strong notion of progress-sensitive noninterference [13] can be expressed by de-
manding that knowledge between low events does not change:
k(c,mP, ~`i) = k(c,mP, ~`i+1)
Progress knowledge enables expressing more permissive policies, such as progress-insensitive
noninterference, which allows leakage of information, but only via termination channels (in
[3] it is called termination-insensitive). This is expressed by requiring equivalence of the
progress knowledge after seeing i events with the knowledge obtained after i+ 1-th event:
k→(c,mP, ~`i) = k(c,mP, ~`i+1)
In the example l := 0; (while h = 0 do skip); l := 1, the knowledge inclusion between the
two events is strict: k(c,mP, (l, 0)) ⊃ k(c,mP, (l, 0)·(l, 1)). Therefore, the example does not
satisfy progress-sensitive noninterference. On the other hand, the low event that follows
the while loop does not reveal more information than the knowledge about the existence
of that event. Formally, k→(c,mP, (l, 0)) = k(c,mP, (l, 0)·(l, 1)), hence the program satisfies
progress-insensitive noninterference.
These definitions also allow us to reason about knowledge changes along parts of the
traces. We say that knowledge is preserved in a progress-(in)sensitive way along a part
of a trace, assuming that the respective knowledge equality holds for the low events that
correspond to that part.
Next, we extend possible observations to a divergence event ⇑ (we write 〈c,m〉 ⇑ to
mean configuration 〈c,m〉 diverges). For attackers that can observe program divergence ⇑,
we define knowledge on the sequence of low events that includes divergence:
Definition 2.3 (Divergence knowledge).
k(c,mP, ~` ⇑) , {m′ | m′P = mP ∧ 〈c,m′〉−→∗~`〈c′′,m′′〉 ∧ 〈c′′,m′′〉 ⇑}
Note that the above definition does not require divergence immediately after ~`— it allows
for more low events to be produced after ~`. Divergence knowledge is used in Section 4.
Let us consider events at which knowledge preservation is broken. We call these events
release events.
Definition 2.4 (Release events). Given a program c and a memory m, such that
〈c,m〉−→∗~`〈c′,m′〉−→∗r
ATTACKER CONTROL AND IMPACT FOR CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY 7
• r is a progress-sensitive release event, if k(c,mP, ~`) ⊃ k(c,mP, ~`·r)
• r is a progress-insensitive release event, if k→(c,mP, ~`) ⊃ k(c,mP, ~`·r)
It is easy to validate that a progress-insensitive release event is also a progress-sensitive
event. For example, in the program low := 1; low ′ := h, the second assignment is both a
progress-sensitive and a progress-insensitive release event. The reverse is not true — in the
program while h = 0 do skip; low := 1 the assignment to low is a progress-sensitive release
event, but is not a progress-insensitive release event.
3. Attacks
To reason about program security in the presence of active attacks, we introduce a formal
model of the attacker. Our formalization follows that in [16], where attacker-provided code
can be injected into the program. This section provides examples of how attacker-injected
code may affect attacker knowledge, followed by a semantic characterization of the attacker’s
influence on knowledge.
First, we extend the syntax to allow execution of attacker-controlled code:
c[~•] ::= . . . | [•]
Next, we introduce notation [~t] to highlight that the trace ~t is produced by attacker-
injected code. The semantics of the language is extended accordingly.
〈a,m〉−→t〈a′,m′〉
〈[a],m〉−→[t]〈[a′],m′〉
〈[stop],m〉−→〈stop,m〉
We limit attacks that can be substituted into holes to so-called fair attacks, which represent
reasonable limitations on the impact of the attacker. Unlike earlier approaches, where fair
attacks are defined syntactically [16, 10], we define them semantically. This allows us to
include a larger set of attacks. To ensure that we include all syntactic attacks we make use
of a reachability translation, explained below.
Roughly, we require a fair attack to not give new knowledge and to not modify trusted
variables. A refinement of this idea is that an attack is fair if it gives new knowledge but
only because the reachability of the attack depends on a secret. To capture this refinement,
we define an auxiliary translation to make reachability of attacks explicit. We assume a
trusted, public variable reach that does not appear in the source of c[~•]. Let operator T 
be a source-to-source transformation of c[~•] that makes reachability of attacks explicit.
Definition 3.1 (Explicit reachability translation). Given a program c[~•], define (T (c[~•])
as follows:
• T ([•]) =⇒ reach := reach + 1; [•]
• T (c1; c2) =⇒ T (c1);T (c2)
• T (if e then c1 else c2) =⇒ if e then T (c1) else T (c2)
• T (while e do c) =⇒ while e do T (c)
• T (c) =⇒ c for all other commands c
The formal definition uses that any trace ~t can be represented as a sequence of subtraces
~t1 · [~t2] · · ·~t2∗n−1 · [~t2∗n], where even-numbered subtraces correspond to the events produced
by attacker-controlled code.
Given a trace ~t, we denote the trusted events in the trace as ~tT. We use notation t? for
a single trusted event, and ~t? for a sequence of trusted events.
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Definition 3.2 (Fair attack). Given a program c[~•], such that T (c[~•]) =⇒ c [~•], say
that ~a is a fair attack on c[~•] if for all memories m, such that 〈c [~a],m〉−→∗~t and ~t =
~t1·[~t2] · · ·~t2∗n−1·[~t2∗n], i.e., there are 2n intermediate configurations 〈cj ,mj〉, 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n, for
which
〈c [~a],m〉−→∗~t1〈c1,m1〉−→∗[~t2]〈c2,m2〉−→∗~t3 . . .−→∗[~t2n]〈c2n,m2n〉 . . .
then for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it holds that k(c [~a],m,~t1 · · ·~t2i−1) = k(c [~a],m,~t1 · · · [~t2i]) and
~t2i? = .
For example, in the program if h > 0 then [•] else skip the attacks a1 = [low := 1]
and attack a2 = [low := h > 0] are fair, but attack a3 = [low := h] is not.
3.1. Examples of attacker influence
This section presents a few examples of attacker influence on knowledge. We also introduce
pure availability attacks and progress attacks, to which we refer later in this section.
In the examples below, we use notation [(u, v)] when a low event (u, v) is generated by
attacker-injected code.
Consider program [•]; low := u > h; where h is a secret variable, and u is an untrusted
public variable. The attacker’s code executes before the low assignment and may change
the value of u. Consider memory m, where m(h) = 7, and the two attacks a1 = u := 0 and
a2 = u := 10. These attacks result in different values being assigned to variable low . The
first trace results in low events [(u, 0)]·(low , 0), while the second trace results in low events
[(u, 10)]·(low , 1). Therefore, the knowledge about the secret is different in each trace. We
have
k(c[a1],mP, [(u, 0)]·(low , 0)) = {m′ | m′(h) ≥ 0}
k(c[a2],mP, [(u, 10)]·(low , 1)) = {m′ | m′(h) < 10}
Clearly, this program gives the attacker some control over what information about secrets
he learns. Observe that it is not necessary for the last assignment to differ in order for the
knowledge to be different. For example, consider attack a3 = u := 5. This attack results
in low events [(u, 5)] ·(low , 0), which do the same assignment to low as a1 does. Attacker
knowledge, however, is different from that obtained by a1:
k(c[a3],mP, [(u, 5)]·(low , 0)) = {m′ | m′(h) ≥ 5}
Next, consider program [•]; low := h. This program gives away knowledge about the value
of h independently of untrusted variables. The only way for the attacker to influence what
information he learns is to prevent that assignment from happening at all, which, as a result,
will prevent him from learning that information. This can be done by an attack such as
a = while true do skip, which makes the program diverge before the assignment is reached.
We call attacks like this pure availability attacks. Another example of a pure availability
attack is in the program [•]; (while u = 0 do skip); low := h. In this program, any attack
that sets u to 0 prevents the assignment from happening.
Consider another example: [•]; while u < h′ do skip; low := 1. As in the previous
example, the value of u may change the reachability of low := 1. Assuming the attacker
can observe divergence, this is not a pure availability attack, because diverging before the
last assignment gives the attacker additional secret information, namely that u < h′. New
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x, v
y, u
z, w
uncertainty uncertainty
low events low events
Figure 5. Similar attacks and traces
information is also obtained if the attacker sees the low assignment. We name attacks
like this progress attacks. In general, a progress attack is an attack that leads to program
divergence in a way that observing that divergence (i.e., detecting there is no progress) gives
new knowledge to the attacker.
3.2. Attacker control
We represent attacker control as a set of attacks that are similar in their influence on knowl-
edge. Intuitively, if a program leaks no information to the attacker, the control corresponds
to all possible attacks. In general, the more attacks are similar, the less influence the at-
tacker has. Moreover, the control is a temporal property and depends on the trace that has
been currently produced. The longer a trace is, the more influence an attack may have, and
the smaller the control set is.
Similar attacks. The key element in the definition of control is specifying when two attacks
are similar. Given a program c[~•], memory m, consider two attacks ~a and ~b that produce
traces ~t and ~q respectively:
〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t and 〈c[~b],m〉−→∗~q
We compare ~a and ~b based on how they change attacker knowledge along their respective
traces. First, if knowledge is preserved along a subtrace of one of the traces, say ~t, it must
be preserved along a subtrace of ~q as well. Second, if at some point in ~t there is a release
event (x, v), there must be a matching low event (x, v) in ~q, and the attacks are similar
along the rest of the traces.
Visually, this requirement is described by the two diagrams in Figure 5. Each diagram
shows the change of knowledge as more low events are produced. Here the x-axis corre-
sponds to low events, and the y-axis reflects the attacker’s uncertainty about initial secrets.
Whenever one of the traces reaches a release event, depicted by vertical drops, there must
be a corresponding low event in the other trace, such that the two events agree. This is
depicted by the dashed lines between the two diagrams.
Formally, these requirements are stated using the following definitions.
Definition 3.3 (Knowledge segmentation). Given a program c, memory m, and a trace ~t, a
sequence of indices p1 . . . pN such that p1 < p2 · · · < pN and ~tP = `1...p1·` p1+1...p2 · · · `pN−1+1...pN
is called
• progress-sensitive knowledge segmentation of size N , if
∀j ≤ N, ∀i . pj−1 + 1 ≤ i < pj . k(c,mP, ~`i) = k(c,mP, ~`i+1), denoted by
Seg(c,m,~t, p1 . . . pN ).
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• progress-insensitive knowledge segmentation of size N if
∀j ≤ N, ∀i . pj−1 + 1 ≤ i < pj . k→(c,mP, ~`i) = k(c,mP, ~`i+1), denoted by
Seg→(c,m,~t, p1 . . . pN ).
Low events pi + 1 for 1 ≤ i < N are called segmentation events.
Note that given a trace, there can be more than one way to segment it, and for every
trace consisting of n low events, this can be trivially achieved by a segmentation of size n.
We use knowledge segmentation to define attack similarity :
Definition 3.4 (Similar attacks and traces ∼c[~•],m ). Given a program c[~•], memory m, and
two attacks ~a and ~b that produce traces ~t and ~q, define ~a and ~b as similar along ~t and ~q
for the progress-sensitive attacker, if there are two segmentations p1 . . . pN and p′1 . . . p′N (for
some N) such that
• Seg(c[~a],m,~t, p1 . . . pN ),
• Seg(c[~b],m, ~q, p′1 . . . p′N ), and
• ∀i . 1 ≤ i < N . tPpi+1 = qPp′i+1.
For the progress-insensitive attacker, the definition is similar except that it uses progress-
insensitive segmentation Seg→. If two attack–trace pairs are similar, we write (~a,~t) ∼c[~•],m
(~b, ~q) (for progress-insensitive similarity, (~a,~t) ∼c[~•],m→ (~b, ~q)).
The construction of Definitions 3.3 and 3.4 can be illustrated by program
[•]; if u then (while h ≤ 100 do skip) else skip; low1 := 0; low2 := h > 100
Consider memory with m(h) = 555, and two attacks a1 = u := 1, and a2 = u := 0.
Both attacks reach the assignments to low variables. However, for a2 the assignment to
low2 is a progress-insensitive release event, while for a1 the knowledge changes at an earlier
assignment.
Attacker control. We define attacker control with respect to an attack ~a and a trace ~t as
the set of attacks that are similar to the given attack in its influence on knowledge.
Definition 3.5 (Attacker control (progress-sensitive)).
R(c[~•],m,~a,~t) , {~b | ∃~q . (~a,~t) ∼c[~•],m (~b, ~q)}
To illustrate how attacker control changes, consider program [•]; low := u < h; low ′ := h
where u is an untrusted variable and h is a secret trusted variable. To understand attacker
control of this program, we consider an initial memory m(h) = 7 and attack a = u := 5.
The low event (low , 1) in this trace is a release event. The attacker control is the set of all
attacks that are similar to a and trace [(u := 5)], (low , 1) in its influence on knowledge. This
corresponds to attacks that set u to values such that u < 7. The assignment to low ′ changes
attacker knowledge as well, but the information that the attacker gets does not depend on
the attack: any trace starting in m and reaching the second assignment produces the low
event (low ′, 7); hence, the attacker control does not change at that event.
Consider the same example but with the two assignments swapped: [•]; low ′ := h; low :=
u < h. The assignment to low ′ is a release event that the attacker cannot affect. Hence
the control includes all attacks that reach this assignment. The result of the assignment to
low depends on u. However, this result does not change attacker knowledge. Indeed, in this
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Figure 6. Release control and robustness
program, the second assignment is not a release event at all. Therefore, the attacker control
is simply all attacks that reach the first assignment.
Progress-insensitive control. For progress-insensitive security, attacker control is defined
similarly using the progress-insensitive comparison of attacks.
Definition 3.6 (Attacker control (progress-insensitive)).
R→(c[~•],m,~a,~t) , {~b | ∃~q . (~a,~t) ∼c[~•],m→ (~b, ~q))}
Consider program [•]; while u < h do skip; low := 1. Here, any attack produces a
trace that preserves progress-insensitive noninterference. If the loop is taken, the program
produces no low events, hence, it gives no new knowledge to the attacker. If the loop is not
taken, and the low assignment is reached, this assignment preserves attacker knowledge in
a progress-insensitive way. Therefore, the attacker control is all attacks.
4. Robustness
Release control. This section defines release control R., which captures the attacker’s influ-
ence on release events. Intuitively, release control expresses the extent to which an attacker
can affect the decision to produce some release event.
Definition 4.1 (Progress-sensitive release control ).
R.(c[~•],m,~a,~t) , {~b | ∃~q . (~a,~t) ∼c[~•],m (~b, ~q) ∧
(∃~r′ . k(c[~b],mP, ~qP) ⊃ k(c[~b],mP, ~qP ·~r′P)
∨ k(c[~b],mP, ~qP) ⊃ k(c[~b],mP, ~qP ⇑)
∨ 〈c[~b],m〉 ⇓)}
The definition for release control is based on the one for attacker control with the three
additional clauses, explained below. These clauses restrict the set of attacks to those that
either terminate or produce a release event. Because the progress-sensitive attacker can also
learn new information by observing divergence, the definition contains an additional clause
(on the third line) that uses divergence knowledge to reflect that.
Figure 6a depicts the relationship between release control and attacker control, where
the x-axis corresponds to low events, and the y-axis corresponds to attacks. The solid line
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depicts attacker control R, where vertical lines correspond to release events. The gray area
denotes release control R.. In general, for a given attack ~a and a corresponding trace ~t·~r,
where ~r contains a release event, we have the following relation between release control and
attacker control:
R(c[~•],m,~a,~t) ⊇ R.(c[~•],m,~a,~t) ⊇ R(c[~•],m,~a,~t·~r) (4.1)
Note the white gaps and the gray release control above the dotted lines on Figure 6a.
The white gaps correspond to difference R(c[~•],m,~a,~t) \ R.(c[~•],m,~a,~t). This is a set of
attacks that do not produce further release events and that diverge without giving any new
information to the attacker—pure availability attacks. The gray zones above the dotted
lines are more interesting. Every such zone corresponds to the difference R.(c[~•],m,~a,~t) \
R(c[~•],m,~a,~t·~r). In particular, when this set is non-empty, the attacker can launch attacks
corresponding to each of the last three lines of Definition 4.1:
(1) either trigger a different release event ~r′, or
(2) cause program to diverge in a way that also releases information, or
(3) prevent a release event from happening in a way that leads to program termination
Absence of such attacks constitutes the basis for our security conditions in Definitions 4.3
and 4.4. Before moving on to these definitions, we introduce the progress-insensitive variant
of release control.
Definition 4.2 (Release control (progress-insensitive)).
R.→(c[~•],m,~a,~t) , {~b | ∃~q . (~a,~t) ∼c[~•],m→ (~b, ~q) ∧
(∃~r′ . k→(c[~b],mP, ~qP) ⊃ k(c[~b],mP, ~qP ·~r′P) ∨ 〈c[~b],m〉 ⇓)}
This definition uses the progress-insensitive variants of similar attacks and release events. It
also does not account for knowledge obtained from divergence.
With the definition of release control at hand we can now define semantic conditions for
robustness. The intuition is that all attacks leading to release events should lead to the same
release event. Formally, this is defined as inclusion of release control into attacker control,
where release control is computed on the prefix of the trace without a release event.
Definition 4.3 (Progress-sensitive robustness). Program c[~•] satisfies progress-sensitive ro-
bustness if for all memories m, attacks ~a, and traces ~t~r, such that 〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t〈c′,m′〉−→∗~r
and ~r contains a release event, i.e., k(c[~a],mP,~tP) ⊃ k(c[~a],mP,~tP ·~rP), we have
R.(c[~•],m,~a,~t) ⊆ R(c[~•],m,~a,~t·~r)
Note that because of Equation 4.1, set inclusion in the above definition could be replaced
with strict equality, but we use ⊆ for compatibility with future definitions. Figure 6b
illustrates the relation between release control and attacker control for robust programs.
Note how release control is bounded by the attacker control at the next release event.
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Examples. We illustrate the definition of robustness with a few examples.
Consider program [•]; low := u < h, and memory such that m(h) = 7. This program is
rejected by Definition 4.3. To see this, pick an a = u := 5, and consider the part of the trace
preceding the low assignment. Release control R.(c[~•],m, a, [(u, 5)]) is all attacks that reach
the assignment to low . On the other hand, the attacker control R(c[~•],m, a, [(u, 5)]·(low , 1))
is the set of all attacks where u < 7, which is smaller than R.. Therefore this program does
not satisfy the condition.
Program [•]; low := h; low ′ := u < h satisfies robustness. The only release event
here corresponds to the first assignment. However, because the knowledge given by that
assignment does not depend on untrusted variables, the release control includes all attacks
that reach the assignment.
Program [•]; if u > 0 then low := h else skip is rejected. Consider memorym(h) = 7,
and attack a = u := 1 that leads to low trace [(u, 1)]·(low , 7). The attacker control for this
attack and trace is the set of all attacks such that u > 0. On the other hand, release control
R.(c[~•],m,~a, [(u, 1)]) is the set of all attacks that lead to termination, which includes attacks
such that u ≤ 0. Therefore, the release control corresponds to a bigger set than the attacker
control.
Program [•]; while u > 0 do skip; low := h is accepted. Depending on the attacker-
controlled variable the release event is reached. However, this is an example of availability
attack, which is ignored by Definition 4.3.
Program [•]; while u > h do skip; low := 1 is rejected. Any attack leading to the
low assignment restricts the control to attacks such that u ≤ h. However, release control
includes attacks u > h, because the attacker learns information from divergence.
The definition of progress-insensitive robustness is similar to Definition 4.3, but uses
progress-insensitive variants of release events, control, and release control. As a result,
program [•]; while u > h do skip; low := 1 is accepted: attacker control is all attacks.
Definition 4.4 (Progress-insensitive robustness). Program c[~•] satisfies progress-insensitive
robustness if for all memoriesm, attacks ~a, and traces ~t~r, such that 〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t〈c′,m′〉−→∗~r
and ~r contains a release event, i.e., k→(c[~a],mP,~tP) ⊃ k(c[~a],mP,~tP ·~rP), we have
R.→(c[~•],m,~a,~t) ⊆ R→(c[~•],m,~a,~t·~r)
5. Endorsement
This section extends the semantic policies for robustness in a way that allows endorsing
attacker-provided values.
Syntax and semantics. We add endorsement to the language:
c[~•] ::= . . . | x := endorseη(e)
We assume that every endorsement in the program source has a unique endorsement label
η. Semantically, endorsements produce endorsement events, denoted byendorse(η, v), which
record the label of the endorsement statement η together with the value v that is endorsed.
〈e,m〉 ↓ v
〈x := endorseη(e),m〉−→endorse(η,v)〈stop,m[x 7→ v]〉
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Whenever the endorsement label is unimportant, we omit it from the examples. Note that
endorse(η, v) events need not mention variable name x since that information is implied by
the unique label η.
Consider example program [•]; low := endorseη1(u < h). This program does not satisfy
Definition 4.3. The reasoning for this is exactly the same as for program [•]; low := u < h
from Section 4.
Irrelevant attacks. Endorsement of certain values gives attacker some control over the
knowledge. The key technical element of this section is the notion of irrelevant attacks,
which defines the set of attacks that are endorsed, and that are therefore excluded when
comparing attacker control with release control. We define irrelevant attacks formally be-
low, based on the trace that is produced by a program.
Given a program c[•], starting memory m, and a trace ~t, irrelevant attacks, denoted
here by Φ(c[~•],m,~t), are the attacks that lead to the same sequence of endorsement events
as in ~t, until they necessarily disagree on one of the endorsements. Because the influence of
these attacks is reflected at endorsement events, we exclude them from consideration when
comparing with attacker control.
We start by defining irrelevant traces. Given a trace ~t, irrelevant traces for ~t are all traces
~t′ that agree with ~t on some prefix of endorsement events until they necessarily disagree on
some endorsement. We define this set as follows.
Definition 5.1 (Irrelevant traces). Given a trace ~t, where endorsements are marked as
endorse(ηj , vj), define a set of irrelevant traces based on the number of endorsements in
~t as φi(~t): φ0(~t) = ∅, and
φi(~t) = {~t′ | ~t′ = ~q ·endorse(ηi, v′i)·~q′} such that
~q is a prefix of ~t′ with i− 1 events all of which agree with endorse events in ~t, and
vi 6= v′i
Define φ(~t) ,
⋃
i φi(~t) as a set of irrelevant traces w.r.t. ~t.
With the definition of irrelevant traces at hand, we can define irrelevant attacks: irrel-
evant attacks are attacks that lead to irrelevant traces.
Definition 5.2 (Irrelevant attacks). Given a program c[~•], initial memory m, and a trace
~t, such that 〈c[~•],m〉−→∗~t, define irrelevant attacks Φ(c[~•],m,~t) as
Φ(c[~•],m,~t) , {~a | 〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t′ ∧ ~t′ ∈ φ(~t)}
Security. The security conditions for robustness can now be adjusted to accommodate en-
dorsements that happen along traces. The idea is to exclude irrelevant attacks from the
left-hand side of Definitions 4.3 and 4.4. This security condition, which has both progress-
sensitive and progress-insensitive versions, expresses roughly the same idea as qualified ro-
bustness [16], but in a more natural and direct way.
Definition 5.3 (Progress-sensitive robustness with endorsements). Program c[~•] satisfies
progress-sensitive robustness with endorsement if for all memories m, attacks ~a, and traces
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Figure 7. Irrelevant attacks and robustness with endorsements
~t~r, such that 〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t〈c′,m′〉−→∗~r and ~r contains a release event, i.e., k(c[~a],mP,~tP) ⊃
k(c[~a],mP,~tP ·~rP), we have
R.(c[~•],m,~a,~t) \ Φ(c[~•],m,~t·~r) ⊆ R(c[~•],m,~a,~t·~r)
We refer to the set R.(c[~•],m,~a,~t) \ Φ(c[~•],m,~t·~r) as a set of relevant attacks. Figures 7a
to 7c visualize irrelevant attacks and the semantic condition of Definition 5.3. Figure 7a
shows the set of irrelevant attacks, depicted by the shaded gray area. This set increases at
endorsement events marked by stars. Figure 7b shows an example trace where robustness is
not satisfied — the gray area corresponding to release control R. exceeds the attacker control
(depicted by the solid line). Finally, in Figure 7c, we superimpose Figures 7a and 7b. This
illustrates that when the set of irrelevant attacks is excluded from the release control (the
area under white dashed lines), the program is accepted by robustness with endorsements.
Examples. Program [•]; low := endorseη1(u < h) is accepted by Definition 5.3. Consider
initial memory m(h) = 7, and an attack u := 1; this produces a trace [(u, 1)]endorse(η1, 1).
The endorsed assignment also produces a release event. We have that
• Release control R. is the set of all attacks that reach the low assignment.
• Irrelevant traces φ([(u, 1)]endorse(η1, 1)) is a set of traces that end in endorsement event
endorse(η1, v) such that v 6= 1. Thus, irrelevant attacks Φ([•]; low := endorseη1(u <
h),m, [(u, 1)]endorse(η1, 1)) must consist of attacks that reach the low assignment and set
u to values u ≥ 7.
• The left-hand side of Definition 5.3 is therefore the set of attacks that reach the endorse-
ment and set u to u < 7.
• As for the attacker control on the right-hand side, it consists of attacks that set u < 7.
Hence, the set inclusion of Definition 5.3 holds and the program is accepted.
Program [•]; low := endorseη1(u); low ′ := u < h′′ is accepted. The endorsement in the first
assignment implies that all relevant attacks must agree on the value of u, and, consequently,
they agree on the value of u < h′′, which gets assigned to low ′. This also means that relevant
attacks belong to the attacker control (which contains all attacks that agree on u < h′′).
Program [•]; low := endorseη1(u < h); low ′ := u < h′′ is rejected. Take initial memory
such that m(h) 6= m(h′). The set of relevant attacks after the second assignment contains
attacks that agree on u < h (due to the endorsement), but not necessarily on u < h′′. The
latter, however, is the requirement for the attacks that belong to the attacker control.
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Program [•]; if u > 0 then h ′ := endorse(u) else skip; low := h′ < h is rejected.
Assume initial memory where m(h) = m(h′) = 7. Consider attack a1 that sets u := 1 and
consider the trace ~t1 that it gives. This trace endorses u in the then branch, overwrites the
value of h′ with 1, and produces a release event (low , 1). Consider another attack a2 that sets
u := 0, and consider the corresponding trace ~t2. This trace contains release event (low , 0)
without any endorsements. Now, attacker control R(c[~•],m, a2,~t2) excludes a1, because of
the disagreement at the release event. At the same time, a1 is a relevant attack for a2,
because no endorsements happen along ~t2.
Consider program c[~•], which contains no endorsements. In this case, for all possible
traces ~t, we have that φ(~t) = φ0(~t) = ∅. Therefore, by Definition 5.2 it must be that
Φ(c[~•],m,~t) = ∅ for all memories m and traces ~t. This indicates that for programs without
endorsements, progress-sensitive robustness with endorsements (Definition 5.3) conserva-
tively reduces to the earlier definition of progress-sensitive robustness (Definition 4.3).
Progress-insensitive robustness with endorsement is defined similarly. The intuition for
the definition remains the same, while we use progress-insensitive variants of progress control
and control:
Definition 5.4 (Progress-insensitive robustness with endorsement). Program c[~•] satisfies
progress-insensitive robustness with endorsement if for all memories m, attacks ~a, and traces
~t·~r, such that 〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t〈c′,m′〉−→∗~r, and ~r contains a release event, i.e., k→(c[~a],mP,~tP) ⊃
k(c[~a],mP,~tP ·~rP), we have
R.→(c[~•],m,~a,~t) \ Φ(c[~•],m,~t·~r) ⊆ R→(c[~•],m,~a,~t·~r)
As a final note in this section, observe that because of the particular use of irrelevant
attacks in Definitions 5.3 and 5.4 it is sufficient for us to define irrelevant traces so that they
only match at the endorsement events. A slightly more generalized notion of irrelevance
would require ~q in Definition 5.1 to be similar to a prefix of ~t′.
6. Enforcement
We now explore how to enforce robustness using a security type system. While this section
focuses on progress-insensitive enforcement, it is possible to refine the type system to deal
with progress sensitivity (modulo availability attacks) [26, 19]. Figures 8 and 9 display
typing rules for expressions and commands. This type system is based on the one of [16]
and is similar to many standard security type systems.
Declassification. We extend the language with a language construct for declassification of
expressions declassify(e). Whereas in earlier examples, we considered an assignment l := h
to be secure if it did not violate robustness, we now require information flows from public
to secret to be mediated by declassification. We note that declassification has no additional
semantics and, in the context of our simple language, can be inferred automatically. This
may be achieved by placing declassifications in public assignments that appear in trusted
code, i.e., in non-• parts of the program. Moreover, making declassification explicit has the
following motivations:
(1) On the enforcement level, the type system conveniently ensures that a non-progress re-
lease event may happen only at declassification. All other assignments preserve progress-
insensitive knowledge.
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Γ ` n : `, ∅ Γ ` x : Γ(x), ∅ Γ ` e1 : `1, D1 Γ ` e2 : `2, D2
Γ ` e1 op e2 : `1 unionsq `2, D1 ∪D2
(T-DECL)
Γ ` e : `,D
Γ ` declassify(e) : ` u (P,U), vars(e)
Figure 8. Type system: expressions
(T-SKIP)
Γ, pc ` skip
(T-SEQ)
Γ, pc ` c1 Γ, pc ` c2
Γ, pc ` c1; c2
(T-ASGMT)
Γ ` e : `,D ` unionsq pc v Γ(x) ∀y ∈ D . Γ(y) v (S,T) D 6= ∅ =⇒ pc v (P,T)
Γ, pc ` x := e
(T-IF)
Γ ` e : `, ∅ Γ, pc unionsq ` ` c1 Γ, pc unionsq ` ` c2
Γ, pc ` if e then c1 else c2
(T-WHILE)
Γ ` e : `, ∅ Γ, pc unionsq ` ` c
Γ, pc ` while e do c
(T-HOLE)
pc v (P,U)
Γ, pc ` •
(T-ENDORSE)
pc unionsq Γ(x) v (S,T) pc v Γ(x) Γ ` e : `, ∅ ` u (S,T) v Γ(x)
Γ, pc ` x := endorse(e)
Figure 9. Type system: commands
(2) Much of the related work on language-based declassification policies uses similar type
systems. Showing our security policies can be enforced using such systems makes the
results more general.
Typing of expressions. Type rules for expressions have form Γ ` e : `,D where ` is the level
of the expression, and D is a set of variables that may be declassified. The declassification
is the most interesting rule among expressions. It downgrades the confidentiality level of
the expression by returning ` u (P,U), and counts all variables in e as declassified.
Typing of commands. The typing judgments for commands have the form Γ, pc ` c. The
rules are standard for a security type system. We highlight typing of assignments, endorse-
ment, and holes.
Assignments have two extra clauses for when the assigned expression contains a de-
classification (D 6= ∅). The rule (T-ASGMT) requires all variables that can be declassified
have high integrity. The rule also bounds the pc-label by (P,T), which enforces that no
declassification happens in untrusted or secret contexts. These requirements guarantee that
the information released by the declassification does not directly depend on the attacker-
controlled variables.
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Sequential composition 1
Sequential composition 2
Advancement Lemma
Control backbone Lemma
Proposition 1
Figure 10. High-level structure of proof of Proposition 6.1
The typing rule for endorsement (T-ENDORSE) requires that the pc-label is trusted
and that the result of the endorsement is stored in a trusted variable: pc unionsq Γ(x) v (S,T).
Note that requiring a trusted pc-label is crucial, while the restriction that x is trusted could
easily be lifted, since trusted values may flow into untrusted variables. Because endorsed
expressions preserve their confidentiality level, we also check that x has the right security
level to store the result of the expression. This is done by demanding that `u (S,T) v Γ(x),
where taking meet of ` and (S,T) boosts integrity, but keeps the confidentiality level of `.
The rule for holes forbids placing attacker-provided code in high confidentiality contexts.
For simplicity, we disallow declassification in the guards of if and while.
6.1. Soundness
This section shows that the type system of Figures 8 and 9 is sound. We formulate top-level
soundness in Proposition 6.1. The proof of Proposition 6.1 appears in the end of the section.
Proposition 6.1. If Γ, pc ` c[~•] then for all attacks ~a, memories m, and traces ~t·~r produced
by 〈c[~a],m〉, where k→(c[~a],mP,~tP) ⊃ k(c[~a],mP,~tP ·~rP), we have that
R.→(c[~•],m,~a,~t) \ Φ(c[~•],m,~t·~r) ⊆ R→(c[~•],m,~a,~t·~r)
Auxiliary definitions. We introduce an auxiliary definition of progress-insensitive noninter-
ference along a part of a trace, abbreviated PINI, which we will use in the proof of Propo-
sition 6.1. Figure 10 shows the high-level structure of the proof. We define declassification
events to be low events that involve declassifications. The central property of this proof
— the control backbone lemma (Lemma 6.8) — captures the behavior of similar attacks
and traces that are generated by well-typed commands. Together with the Advancement
Lemma, it shows that declassification events soundly approximate release events. The proof
of Proposition 6.1 follows directly from the Control Backbone and Advancement lemmas.
Definition 6.2 (Progress-insensitive noninterference along a part of a trace). Given a pro-
gram c, memory m, and two traces ~t and ~t+ such that ~t+ is an extension of ~t, we say that
c satisfies progress-insensitive noninterference along the part of the trace from ~t to ~t+, de-
noted by PINI(c,m,~t,~t+) whenever for the low events in the corresponding traces ~`n , ~tP
and ~`N , ~t+P , n ≤ N , it holds that
∀i . n < i < N . k→(c,mP, ~`i) ⊆ k(c,mP, ~`i+1)
Lemma 6.3 (Noninterference for no declassifications). Given a program c without declas-
sifications such that Γ, pc ` c then for all memories m and possible low events ~`·`′ such
that
〈c,m〉−→∗~`〈c′,m′〉−→∗`′〈c′′,m′′〉
it holds that k→(c,m, ~`) ⊆ k(c,m, ~`·`′).
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Proof. By induction on c (cf. [1]). 2
Lemma 6.4 (Noninterference for the tail of sequential composition). Assume a program c
such that for all memories m and low events `, such that 〈c,m〉−→∗`〈c′,m′〉, it holds that
k→(c,mP, ) ⊆ k(c,mP, `). Then for all programs c0, initial memories i, and low events ~l0,
such that
〈c0; c, i〉−→∗~`
0
〈c, i′〉−→∗`′
we have k→(c0; c, iP, ~`0) ⊆ k(c0; c, iP, ~`0 ·`′).
Proof. Assume the set inclusion of the lemma’s statement does not hold. By Definition 2.2,
there must exist an initial memory m, such that m =P i and 〈c0; c,m〉−→∗~`
0
〈c,m′〉−→∗`′′ ,
but `′ 6= `′′. Because m =P i and both traces produce ~`0, it must also be that m′ =P i′. But
this also implies that m′ 6∈ k(c, i′P, `′), that is, k→(c, i′P, ) 6⊆ k(c, i′P, `′), which contradicts
the main assumption about c. 2
The following two helper lemmas correspond to the sequential composition sub-cases of
the Advancement Lemma. Lemma 6.5 captures the special case when the first command
in the sequential composition c1[•]; c2[•] does not produce a declassification event, while
Lemma 6.6 considers the general case when a declassification event may be produced by
either of c1[•] or c2[•].
Lemma 6.5 (Sequential composition 1). Given
• program ~c0[~•] such that Γ, pc ` c0[~•],
• initial memory m0,
• two initial attacks ~a0,~b0,
• two intermediate configurations 〈c1[~a1]; c2[~a2],m〉 and 〈c1[~b1]; c2[~b2], s〉 such that
• 〈c0[~a0],m0〉−→∗~t′〈c1[~a1]; c2[~a2],m〉−→∗~tα〈c2[~a2],m′〉−→∗~tβ·r
• 〈c0[~b0],m0〉−→∗~q′〈c1[~b1]; c2[~b2], s〉−→∗ ~q′′·r′
• PINI(c0[~a0],m0,~t′, ~t′ ·~tα ·~tβ)
• PINI(c0[~b0],m0, ~q′, ~q′ · ~q′′)
• r and r′ are declassification events
• ~b0 6∈ Φ(c0[~•],m0, ~t′ ·~tα ·~tβ ·r)
• ~t′? = ~q′?
• m =T s
then ~q′′ = ~qα ·~qβ such that
• 〈c1[~a1]; c2[~a2], s〉−→∗~qα〈c2[~a2], s′〉−→∗~qβ·r
• ~tα? = ~qα?
• m′ =T s′
Proof. By induction on the structure of c1[~•]. Case skip is immediate. Consider the other
cases.
• case [~•]
In this case ~a1 = a1 and ~b1 = b1. By assumption, a1 and b1 are fair attacks, which
means that ~tα has no release events and no assignments to trusted variables. Similarly,
because no low assignments can be produced when running ~b1, then by Definition 3.2
there must be s′ and ~qα that would satisfy the demand of the lemma.
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• case x := e
We consider confidentiality and integrity properties separately.
Confidentiality: We show that even if a low event is possible, it is not a release event.
We have two cases, based on the confidentiality level of x.
(a) Γ(x) = (P,_)
A low event is generated by the low assignment. By Lemma 6.3 and Lemma 6.4
the assignment must not be a release event.
(b) Γ(x) = (S,_)
In this case no low events are generated.
Integrity: Next, we show that the resulting memories agree on trusted values. The two
cases are
(a) Γ(x) = (_,T) In this case it must be that Γ(e) = (_,T) and, hence, m(e) = s(e).
Therefore m′ =T s′.
(b) Γ(x) = (_,U) Assignment to x does not change how memories agree on trusted
values.
• case x := endorseη(e)
We consider the confidentiality and integrity properties of this command separately.
Confidentiality: Similar to the case for assignment.
Integrity: We consider two cases.
(a) Γ(x) = (_,T)
In this case, the trace produces an event endorse(η, v). We note ~b0 6∈ Φ(c0[~•],m0, ~t′·
~tα·~tβ·r). In particular, we have that ~q′·~q′′·r′ 6∈ φ(~t′·~tα·~tβ·r). If we assume that the current
command is the i-th endorsement in the trace, we have that ~q′·~q′′·r′ 6∈ φi(~t′·~tα·~tβ·r).
But we also know that ~t′? =T ~q′?. Because, by the rule (T-ENDORSE), the result
of endorsement is assigned to trusted variables, this implies that both ~q′ and ~t′
must agree on the endorsed values. Therefore, the only possibility with which
~q′ · ~q′′ ·r′ 6∈ φi(~t) is that ~q′′ generates endorse(η, v) as well. This implies that value
v is assigned to x in both cases, which guarantees that m′ =T s′.
(b) Γ(x) = (_,U) Not applicable by (T-ENDORSE).
• case cα; cβ
By two applications of induction hypothesis: one to cα; (cβ; c2[~•]) and the other one to
cβ; c2[~•].
• case if e then ctrue else cfalse
We have the following cases based on the type of expression e.
(a) Γ(e) = (_,T)
In this case both branches are taking the same branch and we are done by induction
hypothesis.
(b) Γ(e) = (_,U)
In this case neither of ctrue or cfalse contain declassifications or high integrity assign-
ments. This guarantees that m′ =T s′.
• case while e do cloop
Similar to sequential composition and conditionals.
2
Lemma 6.6 (Sequential composition 2). Given
• program c0[~•] such that Γ, pc ` c0[~•]
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• initial memory m0
• two initial attacks ~a0,~b0
• two intermediate configurations 〈c1[~a1]; c2[~a2],m〉 and 〈c1[~b1]; c2[~b2], s〉 such that
• 〈c0[~a0],m0〉−→∗~t′〈c1[~a1]; c2[~a2],m〉−→∗ ~t′′〈c′1[~a′1]; c2[~a2],m′〉−→(x,v)〈c′′1[~a′′1]; c2[~a2],m′′〉
• 〈c0[~b0],m0〉−→∗~q′〈c1[~b1]; c2[~b2], s〉−→∗ ~q′′〈d′, s′〉−→(y,u)〈d′′, s′′〉
• PINI(c0[~a0],m0, ~t′, ~t′ ·~t′′)
• PINI(c0[~b0],m0, ~q′, ~q′ · ~q′′)
• (x, v) and (y, u) are declassification events
• ~b0 6∈ Φ(c0[~•],m0, ~t′ ·~t′′ ·(x, v))
• ~t′? = ~q′?
• m =T s
then
• ~a′1 = ~a′′1
• there is b′1 such that
• d′ = c′1[~b′1]; c2[~b2]
• d′′ = c′′1[~b′1]; c2[~b2]
• ~t′′? = ~q′′?
• m′ =T s′
• m′′ =T s′′
• (x, v) = (y, u).
Proof. By induction on the structure of c1[~•]. In the cases of [~•], skip, and x := endorse(e)
no declassification events may be produced, so these cases are impossible.
• x := e. When D = ∅, no declassification events may be produced. When D 6= ∅, a
declassification event is produced by both traces. Also, ~t′′ = ~q′′ = , and m′ = m and
s′ = s. Because m =T s and Γ(e) = (_,T) we have that both traces produces the same
declassification event (x, v), and therefore, m′′ =T s′′.
• case cα[aα]; cβ[aβ]
We have two cases depending on whether cα[aα] generates low events:
(a) 〈cα[aα]; (cβ[aβ]; c2[a2]),m〉−→∗`1···`N 〈cβ[aβ]; c2[a2],m′〉 In this case by Lemma 6.5 it
must be that 〈cα[bα]; (cβ[bβ]; c2[b2]),m〉−→∗`1···`′N 〈cβ[bβ]; c2[b2], s′〉 such that m′ =T s′.
Then we can apply the induction hypothesis to cβ[•].
(b) In this case (x, v) is produced by cα[aα] and we are done by application of induction
hypothesis to cα[•].
• case if e then ctrue else cfalse
We have two cases:
(a) Γ(e) = (_,T)
In this case both branches take the same command, and we are done by the induction
hypothesis.
(b) Γ(e) = (_,U).
Impossible, because declassification events are not allowed in untrusted integrity con-
texts.
• case while e do cloop
Similar to sequential composition and conditionals.
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2
Lemma 6.7 (Advancement). Given
• program c0[~•] such that Γ, pc ` c0[~•]
• initial memory m0
• two initial attacks ~a0,~b0
• two intermediate configurations 〈c[~a],m〉 and 〈c[~b], s〉 such that
• 〈c0[~a0],m0〉−→∗~t′〈c[~a],m〉−→∗ ~t′′〈c′[~a′],m′〉−→(x,v)〈c′′[~a′′],m′′〉
• 〈c0[~b0],m0〉−→∗~q′〈c[~b], s〉−→∗ ~q′′〈d′, s′〉−→(y,u)〈d′′, s′′〉
• PINI(c0[~a0],m0, ~t′, ~t′ ·~t′′)
• PINI(c0[~b0],m0, ~q′, ~q′ · ~q′′)
• (x, v) and (y, u) are declassification events
• ~b 6∈ Φ(c0[~•],m0, ~t′ ·~t′′ ·(x, v))
• ~t′? = ~q′?
• m =T s
then
• ~a′ = ~a′′
• there is b′ such that
• d′ = c′[~b′]
• d′′ = c′′[~b′]
• ~t′′? = ~q′′?
• m′ =T s′
• m′′ =T s′′
• (x, v) = (y, u).
Proof. By induction on c[~•]. In the cases of [~•], skip, and x := endorse(e), no declassifi-
cation events may be produced, so these cases are impossible.
• x := e. In case D = ∅, no declassification events may be produced. When D 6= ∅, a
declassification event is produced by both traces. Also, ~t′′ = ~q′′ = , and m′ = m and
s′ = s. Because m =T s and Γ(e) = (_,T) we have that both traces produces the same
declassification event (x, v), and therefore, m′′ =T s′′.
• case cα; cβ
By Lemma 6.6.
• case if e then ctrue else cfalse
We have two cases:
(a) Γ(e) = (_,T)
In this case both branches take the same command and we are done by induction
hypothesis.
(b) Γ(e) = (_,U).
Impossible, because declassification events are not allowed in untrusted integrity con-
texts.
• case while e do cloop
Similar to sequential composition and conditionals.
2
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Lemma 6.8 (Control Backbone). Given Γ, pc ` c[•], memory m, an initial attack ~a and a
trace ~t, such that
〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t1〈c1[~a1],m1〉−→r1〈c′1[~a′1],m′1〉−→∗~t2···ri−1
〈c′i−1[~a′i−1],m′i−1〉−→∗~ti 〈ci[~ai],mi〉−→ri〈c′i[~a′i],m′i〉 −→∗ . . .
where ri are declassification events, then for all ~b, ~q such that (~a,~t) ∼c[~•],m→ (~b, ~q) and ~b 6∈
Φ(c[~•],m,~t), it holds that the respective configurations (highlighted in boxes here) match at
the declassification events, that is
〈c[~b],m〉−→∗~q1〈c1[~b1], s1〉−→r1〈c′1[~b′1], s′1〉−→∗~q2···ri−1
〈c′i−1[~b′i−1], s′i−1〉−→∗~qi 〈ci[~bi], si〉−→ri〈c′i[~b′i], s′i〉 −→∗ . . .
where i ranges over the number of declassification events in ~t, and moreover
• mi =T si and m′i =T s′i
• ~qi? = ~ti?
Proof. By induction on the number of declassification events. The base case, where n = 0,
is immediate. For the inductive case, assume the proposition holds for the first n declassifi-
cation events in ~t, and apply Lemma 6.7.
2
We conclude this section with the proof of Proposition 6.1.
Proof of Proposition 6.1 Consider ~b ∈ R.→(c[~•],m,~a,~t) \ Φ(c[~•],m,~t ·~r). We want
to show that ~b ∈ R→(c[~•],m,~a,~t ·~r). Because ~b ∈ R.→(c[~•],m,~a,~t), we have that ~b ∈
{~b | ∃~q . (~a,~t) ∼c[~•],m→ (~b, ~q) ∧ (∃~r′ . k→(c[~b],mP, ~qP) ⊃ k(c[~b],mP, ~qP·~r′P)∨ 〈c[~b],m〉 ⇓)}. We
consider the two cases
(1) ~b ∈ {~b | ∃~q . (~a,~t) ∼c[~•],m→ (~b, ~q) ∧ ∃~r′ . k→(c[~b],mP, ~qP) ⊃ k(c[~b],mP, ~qP ·~r′P)}
By definition of Φ(c[~•],m,~t·~r), we have that ~b 6∈ Φ(c[~•],m,~t·~r) =⇒ ~b 6∈ Φ(c[~•],m,~t).
By the Control Backbone Lemma 6.8, we have that two traces agree on the declassi-
fication points up to the length of ~t, and in particular there are ~t0,~t1, ~q0, ~q1 such that
~t = ~t0·~t1·~r and ~q = ~q0·~q1 and that there are no release events along ~t1 and ~q1, for which
it holds that
〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t0〈c′[~a′],m′〉−→∗~t1·~r
and
〈c[~b],m〉−→∗~q0〈c′[~b′], s′〉−→∗~q1·~r′
where ~t? = ~q? and m′ =T s′. By Advancement Lemma 6.7, we obtain that both traces
must agree on ~r and ~r′. This is sufficient to extend the original partitioning of (~a,~t) and
(~b, ~q) to (~a,~t·~r) and (~b, ~q0 ·~q1 ·~r′) such that (~a,~t·~r) ∼c[~•],m→ (~b, ~q0 ·~q1 ·~r′).
(2) ~b ∈ {~b | ∃~q . (~a,~t) ∼c[~•],m→ (~b, ~q) ∧ 〈c[~b],m〉 ⇓}
This case is impossible. By the Control Backbone Lemma 6.8 there must be two
respective configurations 〈c′[~a′],m′〉 and 〈c′[~b′], s′〉 where m′ =T s′, such that 〈c′[~a′],m′〉
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leads to a release event, but 〈c′[~b′], s′〉 terminates without release events. By analysis of
c′, similar to the Advancement Lemma, we conclude that none of the cases is possible.2
7. Checked endorsement
Realistic applications endorse attacker-provided data based on certain conditions. For in-
stance, an SQL string that depends on user-provided input is executed if it passes saniti-
zation, a new password is accepted if the user can provide an old one, and a secret key is
accepted if nonces match. Because this is a recurring pattern in security-critical applications,
we argue for language support in the form of checked endorsements.
This section extends the language with checked endorsements and derives both security
conditions and a typing rule for them. Moreover, we show checked endorsements can be
decomposed into a sequence of direct endorsements, and prove that for well-typed programs,
the semantic conditions for robustness are the same with checked endorsements and with
unchecked endorsements.
Syntax and semantics. In the scope of this section, we assume checked endorsements are
the only endorsement mechanism in the language. We introduce a syntax for checked en-
dorsements:
c[~•] ::= . . . | endorseη(x) if e then c else c
The semantics of this command is that a variable x is endorsed if the expression e evaluates
to true. If the check succeeds, the then branch is taken, and x is assumed to have high
integrity there. If the check fails, the else branch is taken. As with direct endorsements,
we assume checked endorsements in program text have unique labels η. These labels may
be omitted from the examples, but they are explicit in the semantics.
Endorsement events. Checked endorsement events checked(η, v, b) record the unique label
of the endorsement command η, the value of variable that can potentially be endorsed v,
and a result of the check b, which can be either 0 or 1.
m(e) ↓ v v 6= 0
〈endorseη(x) if e then c1 else c2,m〉checked(η,m(x),1)−→ 〈c1,m〉
m(e) ↓ v v = 0
〈endorseη(x) if e then c1 else c2,m〉checked(η,m(x),0)−→ 〈c2,m〉
Irrelevant attacks. For checked endorsement we define a suitable notion of irrelevant at-
tacks. The reasoning behind this is the following.
(1) Both ~t and ~t′ reach the same endorsement statement: ηi = η′i.
(2) At least one of them results in the positive endorsement: bi + b′i ≥ 1. This ensures that
if both traces do not take the branch then none of the attacks are ignored.
(3) The endorsed values are different: vi 6= v′i. Otherwise, there should be no further
difference in what the attacker can influence along the trace.
The following definitions formalize the above construction.
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Definition 7.1 (Irrelevant traces). Given a trace ~t, where endorsements are labeled as
checked(ηj , vj , bj), define a set of irrelevant traces based on the number of checked endorse-
ments in ~t as ψi(~t). Then ψ0(~t) = ∅, and
ψi(~t) = {~t′ | ~t′ = ~q ·checked(ηi, v′i, b′i)·~q′} such that
~q is a prefix of ~t′ with i− 1 checked events, all of which agree with checked events in ~t,
(bi + b
′
i ≥ 1) ∧ (vi 6= v′i), and
~q′ contains no checked events
Define ψ(~t) ,
⋃
i ψi(~t) as a set of irrelevant traces w.r.t. ~t.
Definition 7.2 (Irrelevant attacks ). Ψ(c[~•],m,~t) , {~a| 〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t′ ∧ ~t′ ∈ ψ(~t)}
Using this definition, we can define security conditions for checked robustness.
Definition 7.3 (Progress-sensitive robustness with checked endorsement). Program c[~•]
satisfies progress-sensitive robustness with checked endorsement if for all memories m and
all attacks ~a, such that 〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~a〈c′,m′〉−→∗~r, and ~r contains a release event, i.e.,
k(c[~a],mP,~tP) ⊃ k(c[~a],mP,~tP ·~rP), we have
R.(c[~•],m,~a,~t) \Ψ(c[~•],m,~t·~r) ⊆ R(c[~•],m,~a,~t·~r)
The progress-insensitive version is defined similarly, using progress-insensitive definition for
release events and progress-insensitive versions of control and release control.
Example. In program [•]; endorseη1(u) if u = u′ then low := u < h else skip, the
attacker can modify u and u′. This program is insecure because the unendorsed, attacker-
controlled variable u′ influences the decision to declassify. To see that Definition 7.3 rejects
this program, consider running it in memory with m(h) = 7, and two attacks: a1, where
attacker sets u := 5;u′ := 0, and a2, where attacker sets u := 5;u′ = 5. Denote the corre-
sponding traces up to endorsement by ~t1 and ~t2. We have ~t1 = [(u, 5)·(u′, 0)]·checked(η1, 5, 0)
and ~t2 = [(u, 5) · (u′, 5)] ·checked(η1, 5, 1). Because endorsement in the second trace suc-
ceeds, this trace also continues with a low event (low , 1). Following Definition 7.1 we
have that t1 6∈ ψ(~t2 · (low , 1)), implying a1 6∈ Ψ(c[~•],m,~t2 · (low , 1)). Therefore, a1 ∈
R.(c[~•],m,~a2,~t2) \Ψ(c[~•],m,~t2·(low , 1)). On the other hand, a1 6∈ R(c[~•],m,~a2,~t2·(low , 1))
because a1 can produce no low events corresponding to (low , 1).
Endorsing multiple variables. The syntax for checked endorsements can be extended to
multiple variables with the following syntactic sugar, where ηi is an endorsement label
corresponding to variable xi:
endorse(x1, . . . xn) if e then c1 else c2 =⇒ endorseη1(x1) if e then
endorseη2(x2) if true then . . . c1 else skip . . . else c2
Note that in this encoding the condition is checked as early as possible; an alternative
encoding here would check the condition in the end. While such encoding would have an
advantage of type checking immediately, we believe that checking the condition as early as
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possible avoids spurious (albeit harmless in this simple context) endorsements of all but the
last variable, and is therefore more faithful semantically.
Typing checked endorsements. To enforce programs with checked endorsements, we extend
the type system with the following general rule:
(T-CHECKED)
Γ′ , Γ[xi 7→ Γ(xi) u (S,T)] Γ′ ` e : `′, D′ pc′ , pc unionsq `′
pc′ v (S,T) Γ′, pc′ ` c1 Γ, pc′ ` c2
Γ, pc ` endorse(x1, . . . , xn) if e then c1 else c2
The expression e is type-checked in an environment Γ′ in which endorsed variables x1, . . . xn
have trusted integrity; its label `′ is joined to form auxiliary pc-label pc′. The level of
pc′ must be trusted, ensuring that endorsements happen in a trusted context, and that
no declassification in e depends on untrusted variables other than the xi (this effectively
subsumes the need to check individual variables in D′). Each of the branches is type-checked
with the program label set to pc′; however, for c1 we use the auxiliary typing environment
Γ′, since the xi are trusted there.
Program [•]; endorse(u) if u = u′ then low := declassify(u < h) else skip is
rejected by this type system. Because variable u′ is not endorsed, the auxiliary pc-label has
untrusted integrity.
7.1. Relation to direct endorsements
Finally, for well-typed programs we can safely translate checked endorsements to direct en-
dorsements using a translation in which a checked endorsement of n variables is translated
to n+ 1 direct endorsements. First, we unconditionally endorse the result of the check. The
rest of the endorsements happen in the then branch, before translation of c1. We save the
results of the endorsements in temporary variables t1 . . . tn and replace all occurrences of
x1 . . . xn within c1 with the temporary ones (we assume that each ti has the same confi-
dentiality level as the corresponding original xi, and t0 has the confidentiality level of the
expression e). All other commands are translated to themselves.
Definition 7.4 (Labeled translation from checked endorsements to direct endorsements).
Given a program c[~•] that only uses checked endorsements, we define its labeled translation
to direct endorsements Jc[~•]K inductively:
• Jendorseη(x1, . . . xn) if e then c1 else c2K =⇒ t0 := endorseη0(e); if t0
then t1 := endorseη1(x1); . . . tn := endorseηn(xn); Jc1[ti/xi]K else Jc2K
• Jc1; c2K =⇒ Jc1K; Jc2K
• Jif e then c1 else c2K =⇒ if e then Jc1K else Jc2K
• Jwhile e do cK =⇒ while e do JcK
• JcK =⇒ c, for other commands c.
Adequacy of translation for checked endorsements for well-typed programs. Next we show
adequacy of the labeled translation of Definition 7.4 for well-typed programs. Note that for
non-typed programs this adequacy does not hold, as shown by an example in the end of the
section.
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Without loss of generality, we assume checked endorsements have only one variable
(n = 1 in the translation of checked endorsement in Definition 7.4). We adopt an indexing
convention where checked endorsement with the label ηi, corresponds to two direct endorse-
ments with the labels η2i−1 and η2i. The following lemma establishes a connection between
irrelevant attacks of the source and translated runs.
Lemma 7.5 (Synchronized endorsements). Given a program c[~•] that only uses checked
endorsements, such that Γ, pc ` c[~•], memory m, and attack ~a, such that
〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t and 〈Jc[~a]K,m〉−→∗~ˆt
where
• ~t = ~t′ ·checked(ηi, vi, bi) and
• ~ˆt = ~ˆt′ ·endorse(η2i−1, 0) or ~ˆt = ~ˆt′ ·endorse(η2i−1, 1)·endorse(η2i, v)
• k is a number of checked endorse events in ~t and
we have that
• R(c[~•],m,~a,~t) = R(Jc[~•]K,m,~a, ~ˆt).
• R→(c[~•],m,~a,~t) = R→(Jc[~•]K,m,~a, ~ˆt).
• Φ(Jc[~•]K,m, ~ˆt) = Ψ(c[~•],m,~t)
Proof. The first two items follow from the definition of the translation, because the trans-
lation does not generate new release events.
To prove the second item, we consider partitions of irrelevant traces generated by every
k-th checked endorsement and the direct endorsement(s) that correspond to it. We proceed
by induction on k. For the base case, k = 0, i.e., neither ~t nor ~ˆt contain endorsements,
it holds that Φ(Jc[~•]K,m, ~ˆt) = Ψ(c[~•],m,~t) = ∅. For the inductive case, define a pair of
auxiliary sets
Fk , Φ(Jc[~•]K,m, ~ˆt) \ Φ(Jc[~•]K,m, ~ˆt′)
Pk , Ψ(c[~•],m,~t) \Ψ(c[~•],m, ~t′)
By the induction hypothesis, Φ(c[~•],m, ~ˆt′) = Ψ(c[~•],m, ~t′). By Definitions 5.2 and 7.2, we
know that Φ(Jc[~•]K,m, ~ˆt) ⊇ Φ(Jc[~•]K,m, ~ˆt′) and Ψ(c[~•],m,~t) ⊇ Ψ(c[~•],m, ~t′). Therefore, in
order to prove that Φ(Jc[~•]K,m, ~ˆt) = Ψ(c[~•],m,~t) it is sufficient to show that Fk = Pk. We
consider each direction of equivalence separately.
• Fk ⊇ Pk. Take an attack ~b ∈ Pk. That is 〈c[~b],m〉 produces a trace ~q such that ~q agrees
on all checked endorsements with ~t except the last one. There are three possible ways in
which these endorsements may disagree:
(a) Trace ~t contains checked(ηk, vk, 1) and ~q contains checked(ηk, v′k, 1) such that vk 6= v′k.
By the rules for the translation, it must be that the trace ~ˆt, which is produced by con-
figuration 〈Jc[~a]K,m〉, has two corresponding endorsement events endorse(η2k−1, 1)
and endorse(η2k, vk). Similarly, the trace ~ˆq, produced by 〈Jc[~b]K,m〉, has two corre-
sponding endorsement events endorse(η2k−1, 1) and endorse(η2k, v′k). Because v
′
k 6=
vk we have that ~ˆq ∈ φ(~ˆt).
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(b) Trace ~t contains checked endorsement event checked(ηk, vk, 1), while trace ~q contains
event checked(ηk, v′k, 0). In this case, the trace ~ˆt obtained from running 〈Jc[~a]K,m〉
must contain two endorsement events endorse(η2k−1, 1) and endorse(η2k, vk), while
the trace ~ˆq corresponding to 〈Jc[~b]K,m〉 contains one event endorse(η2k−1, 0). There-
fore, ~ˆq ∈ φ(~ˆt).
(c) Trace ~t contains checked endorsement event checked(ηk, vk, 0), while trace ~q contains
event checked(ηk, v′k, 1). This is similar to the previous case.
From ~ˆq ∈ φ(~ˆt) it follows that ~b ∈ Fk.
• Fk ⊆ Pk. Take an attack ~b ∈ Fk. There must be a trace ~ˆq, produced by 〈Jc[~b]K,m〉, such
that ~ˆq ∈ φ(~ˆt). There are two ways this can happen:
(a) ~ˆq and ~ˆt disagree at the translated endorsement event that has label η2k−1. More
precisely, one must have form endorse(η2k−1, 1) and the other, endorse(η2k−1, 0). In
the original run, this corresponds to two traces ~t and ~q such that ~t contains the
event checked(ηk, bk, vk) and ~q contains the event checked(ηk, b′k, v
′
k). We know that
bk = 1 and b′k = 0, and hence bk + b
′
k ≤ 1. According to Definition 7.1, we need to
show that v′k 6= vk. Assume this is not the case, and that v′k = vk. Then by rule
(T-CHECKED), we have bk = b′k, which contradicts the earlier conclusion. Hence
~q ∈ ψ(~t).
(b) Alternatively, ~ˆq and ~ˆt disagree at the endorsement event that has label η2k. This also
means that they agree on the earlier endorsement, i.e., for the corresponding trace
with checked endorsement, we can show that bk = b′k = 1, and vk 6= v′k. Therefore,
~q ∈ ψ(~t).
From ~q ∈ ψ(~t) it follows that ~b ∈ Pk.
Using Lemma 7.5 we can show the following Proposition, which relates the security of the
source and translated programs.
Proposition 7.6 (Relation of checked and direct endorsements). Given a program c[~•] that
only uses checked endorsements such that Γ, pc ` c[~•], then c[~•] satisfies progress-insensitive
robustness for checked endorsements if and only Jc[~•]K satisfies progress-insensitive robust-
ness for direct endorsements.
Proof. Note that our translation preserves typing: when Γ, pc ` c[~•], then Γ, pc ` Jc[~•]K.
Therefore, by Proposition 6.1 the translated program satisfies progress-insensitive robust-
ness with endorsements. To show that the source program satisfies the progress-insensitive
robustness with checked endorsements, we use Lemma 7.5 and note that the corresponding
sets of irrelevant attacks and control between any two runs of the programs must be in
sync. 2
Notes on the adequacy of the translation. We observe two facts about the adequacy of
this translation. First, for non-typed programs, the relation does not hold. For instance, a
program like
[•]; endorse(u) if u = u′ then low := declassify(u < h) else skip
does not satisfy Definition 7.3. However, translation of this program satisfies Definition 5.3.
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Second, observe that omitting endorsement of the expression would lead to occlusion.
Consider an alternative translation that endorses only the variables x1, . . . xn but not the
result of the whole expression. Using such a translation, a program
if u · 0 > 0 then skip else skip; trusted := x
is translated to
temp := x; if t · 0 > 0 then skip else skip; trusted := x
However, while the first program does not satisfy Definition 7.3, the second program is
accepted by Definition 5.3.
8. Attacker impact
In prior work, robustness controls the attacker’s ability to cause information release. In the
presence of endorsement, the attacker’s ability to influence trusted locations also becomes
an important security issue. To capture this influence, we introduce an integrity dual to
attacker knowledge, called attacker impact. Similarly to low events, we define trusted events
as assignments to trusted variables and termination.
Definition 8.1 (Attacker impact ). Given a program c[~•], memory m, and trusted events
~t?, define p(c[~•],m,~t?) to be a set of attacks ~a that match trusted events ~t?:
p(c[~•],m,~t?) , {~a | 〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t′ ∧ ~t? = ~t′T}
Attacker impact is defined with respect to a given sequence of trusted events ~t?, starting in
memory m, and program c[~•]. The impact is the set of all attacks that agree with ~t? in their
footprint on trusted variables.
Intuitively, a smaller set for attacker impact means that the attacker has greater power
to influence trusted events. Similarly to progress knowledge, we define progress impact,
characterizing which attacks lead to one more trusted event. This then allows us to define
robustness conditions for integrity, which have not previously been identified.
Definition 8.2 (Progress impact). Given a program c[~•], memory m, and sequence of
trusted events ~t?, define progress impact p→(c[~•],m,~t?) as
p→(c[~•],m,~t?) , {~a | 〈c[~a],m〉−→∗~t′〈c′,m′〉 ∧ ~t? = ~t′T ∧ 〈c′,m′〉−→∗t′′?}
The intuition for the baseline robustness for integrity is that attacker should not influence
trusted data. This is similar to noninterference for integrity (modulo availability attacks,
which have not been explored in this context before). However unlike earlier work, we can
easily extend the notion of integrity robustness to endorsements and checked endorsements.
Definition 8.3 (Progress-insensitive integrity robustness with endorsements). A program
c[~•] satisfies progress-insensitive robustness for integrity if for all memories m, and for all
traces ~t·t? where t? is a trusted event, we have
p→(c[~•],m,~tT) \ Φ(c[~•],m,~t·t?) ⊆ p(c[~•],m,~tT ·t?)
Irrelevant attacks are defined precisely as in Section 5. We omit the corresponding definitions
for programs without endorsements and with checked endorsements.
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1 [•]
2 endorse(guess, new_password)
3 if (declassify(guess==password))
4 then
5 password = new_password;
6 nfailed = 0;
7 ok = true;
8 else
9 nfailed = nfailed + 1;
10 ok = false;
Figure 11. Password update
1 [•]
2 endorse(req_time)
3 if (req_time <= now)
4 then
5 if (req_time >= embargo_time)
6 then return declassify(new_data)
7 else return old_data
8 else
9 return old_data
Figure 12. Accessing embar-
goed information
The type system of Section 6 also enforces integrity robustness with endorsements, re-
jecting insecure programs such as t := u and if (u1) then t := endorse(u2), but accepting
t := endorse(u). Moreover, a connection between checked and direct endorsements, analo-
gous to Proposition 7.6, holds for integrity robustness too.
9. Examples
Password update. Figure 11 shows code for updating a password. The attacker controls
variables guess of level (P,U) and new_password of level (S,U). The variable password
has level (S,T) and variables nfailed and ok have level (P,T). The declassification on
line 3 uses the untrusted variable guess. This variable, however, is listed in the endorse
clause on line 2; therefore, the declassification is accepted. The initially untrusted variable
new_password has to be endorsed to update the password on line 5. The example also
shows how other trusted variables—nfailed and ok—can be updated in the then and else
branches.
Data sanitization. Figure 12 shows an annotated version of the code from the introduction,
in which some information (new_data) is not allowed to be released until time embargo_time.
The attacker-controlled variable is req_time of level (P,U), and new_data has level (S,T).
The checked endorse ensures that the attacker cannot violate the integrity of the test
req_time >= embargo_time. (Variable now is high-integrity and contains the current time).
Without the checked endorse, the release of new_data would not be permitted either seman-
tically or by the type system.
10. Related work
Prior robustness definitions [16, 10], based on equivalence of low traces, do not differentiate
programs such as [•]; low := u < h; low ′ := h and [•]; low ′ := h; low := u < h; Per
dimensions of information release [24], the new security conditions cover not only the “who”
dimension, but are also sensitive to “where” information release happens. Also, the security
condition of robustness with endorsement does not suffer from the occlusion problems of
qualified robustness. Balliu and Mastroeni [6] derive sufficient conditions for robustness
using weakest precondition semantics. These conditions are not precise enough to distinguish
the examples above, and, moreover, do not support endorsement.
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Prior work on robustness semantics defines termination-insensitive security conditions
[16, 6]. Because the new framework is powerful enough to capture the security of programs
with intermediate observable events, it can describe the robustness of nonterminating pro-
grams. Prior work on qualified robustness [16] uses a non-standard scrambling semantics in
which qualified robustness unfortunately becomes a possibilistic condition, leading to anom-
alies such as reachability of dead code. The new framework avoids such artifacts because it
uses a standard, deterministic semantics.
Checked endorsement was introduced informally in the Swift web application frame-
work [9] as a convenient way to implement complex security policies. The current paper is
the first to formalize and to study the properties of checked endorsement.
Our semantic framework is based on the definition of attacker knowledge, developed
in prior work introducing gradual release [1]. Attacker knowledge is used for expressing
confidentiality policies in recent work [7, 3, 2, 8]. However, none of this work considers
integrity; applying attacker-centric reasoning to integrity policies is novel.
11. Conclusion
We have introduced a new knowledge-based framework for semantic security conditions
for information security with declassification and endorsement. A key technical innovation
is characterizing the impact and control of the attacker over information in terms of sets
of similar attacks. Using this framework, we can express semantic conditions that more
precisely characterize the security offered by a security type system, and derive a satisfactory
account of new language features such as checked endorsement.
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